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GOD'S ETERNITY
David B. Burrell
This essay seeks to demonstrate two related theses: that (I) God, to be God,
must be eternal, and (II) there is no eternity other than God's eternity. They are
related in the following ways. (1) The one whose existence needs no cause
cannot have a beginning and so must stand outside all that does; moreover, what
exists of itself cannot but be eternal, since there is no other way for such a one
to be. (2) Yet this use of 'eternal', linked as it is with the manner in which the
source of all must be said to be, should not be presumed to mean the same as
'atemporal' or 'timeless'. Nor is this caution merely stipulative, for the fact that
some realities (like numbers or tautologies) may be indifferent to time ought not
be confused with what cannot be temporal yet must (ex hypothesi) be intimately
related to temporal things-as the source and origin of them all.
The demonstration of these theses, then, amounts to an extended conceptual
clarification, through which a clear grasp of each will illuminate the other. That
clarification will also contain a recommendation for pursuing questions of
philosophical theology, for the very manner in which such questions are treated
already displays a way of speaking about divinity, and hence reveals a position
regarding use of the language to convey the nature of God and of God's relation
to the world. So, by insisting that 'eternal' be restricted to assertions about
divinity, 1 wish to call into question the propriety of speaking of eternity as a
"mode of being," as though there were, among the store of being, eternal ones
and temporal ones.
I. ETERNITY: A FORMAL FEATURE OF DNINITY

By insisting that eternity must characterize the one whose essence is (simply)
to exist, and only such One, 1 am asserting, of course, that the only way that
One can be is eternally. And if adverbs bespeak modes, then one not only may
but must say that God's "mode of being" is eternal. Yet such phraseology is
misleading precisely to the extent that it lulls us into thinking that we know what
it is to speak of being, and know as well how that subject divides into temporal
and eternal. Here the adverbial reminder is a useful one: "modes" are usually
invoked to call attention not to ordinary features, where adjectives will do; but
to what Wittgenstein called "formal features," where a different way of relating
FAITH AND PHILOSOPHY
Vol. 1 NO.4 October 1984
All rights reserved.

389

390

David B. Burrell

to the subject is called for from us-something adverbs express. I
In those situations where we cannot positively identify what it is about the
item in question which elicits the particular response from us, then our very
inability to characterize that feature descriptively leads us to call it a mode, since
we do know that a different response is called for. All I am cautioning here is
that we not be misled into treating such modes as though they were features,
and features of something of which we had hold, thus assimilating their grammer
to that adjectives, on a pattern of genus and specific difference.
For the fact is that the beings with which we are acquainted are all temporal,
and those which we discover to be implied by our discourse are either temporal
or atemporal, but none is, strictly speaking, eternal. To find such a one I must
be led beyond whatever is to the source of all that is. That such a one must be
eternal, or must eternally be, is the consistent testimony of those religious traditions which assert divinity to be creator. Jewish, Christian, and Muslim
philosophers and religious thinkers have, until very recent times, concurred in
this judgment. Anselm (1033-1109) assembles the elements of the argument in
his Proslogion. 2 Speaking of divinity, he begins (in what some would call his
"second proof'): "quod utique sic vere est ut nec cogitari possit non esse"
["certainly this being so truly exists that it cannot be even thought not to exist"]
(III). Now what cannot be thought not to be "solus igitur verissime omnium, et
ideo maxime omnium habes esse ... " ["You alone, then, of all things most truly
exist and therefore of all things possess existence to the highest degree" J (III).
How? "Sed certe quidquid es, non per aliud es quam per te ipsum. Tu es igitur
ipsa vita qua vivis ... " ["But clearly, whatever You are, you are not that through
another but through Your very self. You are therefore the very life by which
You live ... "] (XII). God must be, then, that life by which God lives; no distinction
quid est and quo est. Yet Anselm speaks of other eternal entities- created spirits
(XIII). How is God yet more eternal than they? Because God's eternity contains
all, the past, present, and future of time (XIX) as well as the not yet of immortal
spirits: "tua et illorum aeternitas tota tibi praesens est" ["Your eternity and theirs
is wholly present to You"] (XX).such beings will better henceforth be called
"semipiternal" than eternaJ;3 what distinguishes God's eternity is that it "contains
even the aeons of time" (XXI), and the reason it does is that "Tu solus, ergo,
Domine, es quod es, et tu es qui es .... Tu vero es quod es, quia quidquid aliquando
aut aliquo modo es, hoc totus et semper es. Et tu es qui proprie et simpliciter
es, quia nec habes fuisse aut futurus esse, sed tantum praesens esse, nec potes
cogitari aliquando non esse" [You alone then, Lord, are what You are and You
are who You are ... You are what you are, for whatever You are at any time or
in any way this You are wholly and forever. And You are the being who exists
in a strict and absolute sense because You have neither past nor future existence
but only present existence; nor can You be thought not to exist at any time"]
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(XXII).
The two metaphors of containing and present to are used with explicit reference
to the manner in which the soul must be said to be present to all parts of the
body (XIII), and so is better said to contain the body than to be contained in it. 4
God's existence is said to be simple because it is totally present to itself-the
decisive note of eternity; yet that must be the case because "non per aliud es
quam per te ipsum" ["You are not what You are through another"] (XII). So
the argument is circular: simply to be entails being eternally, and vice-versa.
Why? What is going on here? Not a surreptitious proof that God exists, but an
attempt to characterize the One from whom comes all that is. Such a one, then,
can only exist of itself: "non per aliud es quam per te ipsum," because it cannot
belong to that universe whose existence comes from another. Creation, then, is
the cosmic structure presupposed, so the philosophic task becomes one of
articulating the manner of being of the creator of all that is.
The temptation, of course, would be to overlook the distinction of creator
from creation, and go on to speak of God as among the store of things that are.
God would, to be sure, occupy the first place among all things, and be characterized by distinguishing properties like aseity. That is, unlike everything else
that is, God would not be caused but exist of itself. In other words, God is
among the set of existing things, yet exists in a manner different from any other.
Whoever is prepared to speak that way, however, must also be prepared to show
why there is only one such divinity, for aseity looks enough like a distributable
property for the question to arise.
Anselm's strategy, however, is designed to keep such a question from arising,
by incorporating the distinction of creator from creation in a formulation displaying how it can coherently only be said of the One from whom comes all
that is, and that such a One must exist of itself. For nothing else can be said of
that One, yet it need not (and does not) follow that we know what we have said!
Aseity, in short, is not a property of things like one of Aristotle's predictables.
It is rather a "formal feature" of divinity, like "created" is of all that comes forth
from the creator. The only possible hold we have on something's "existing of
itself' would be by way of contrast with the total context for our thought and
action: the created universe. The philosophic task lies in displaying that distinction
and thus the uniqueness of the One standing over against all that is. 5
By his disarming way of putting aseity-that such a One "simply is"-Anselm
underscores that he is not assigning a property to God as one might to any created
object, by going on to insist that "simply to be" entails "neither past nor future
but only present being." Simply to be sets one apart from created being, which
has its being from another. The language of 'before' and 'after' is co-terminous
with creation, as Augustine reminded us, because what "simply is" has no stages
to mark. Linking eternity with aseity, then offers a way of concatenating formal
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features so as to characterize a divinity properly distinguished from all that it
creates.
So Richard of St. Victor, writing in the mid-twelfth century, will insist "nihil
enim omnino potest esse a semetipso quod non sit ab aeterno" (VI): to exist of
itself entails existing eternally. 6 "For that substance which can be only of itself
pertains to that [mode of] being which is eternal and without any beginning"
(XI). In completing his demonstration of the unity of the divine nature, Richard
concludes: "salus itaque et unus Deus est a semetipso et eo ipso ab aeterno"
["the one God alone exists of itself and hence from eternity"] (XCII).
The argumentation is simple and direct; it hardly seems beholden to a "Greek
predilection for permanence over change," though the power of archetypes can
never be gainsaid. It is rather a clear perception that what exists of itself is in
a way in which it is entirely present to itself, and the name given to that mode
of being is eternal. The metaphors of such a being's eternity containing time,
so that each moment of time is present to it, are in place. One step remains: to
display that manner of existing in such a way as to make manifest how it uniquely
characterizes the source of all, and does so in such a way as to display that it
is the source of all. Eternity will then emerge not as a "mode of being" (except
after the manner of speaking in which we have allowed that expression thus far),
but as a formal feature of divinity as such: God, to be God, must be eternally;
and there will be no eternity other than God's eternity.
2. CHARACTERIZING THE DIFFERENCE

The step must show what it is for something to be of itself. The formula is
there in Anselm, but without the means of systematically understanding it. That
was to come form Ibn-Sina (980-1037), known in the West as Avicenna, whose
life just preceded that of Anselm, but whose works were not available to the
West until after Richard of St. Victor wrote his de Trinitate. Inheritor of an
Aristotelian Platonism, transmitted through Alexandria, Ibn-Sina needed to make
philosophical room for a creator. This he did by remarking how the fact that
something exists is not part of our notion of what the thing is (mahiyya), but
"comes to" whatever is. (His mode of expression made it sound as though existing
is an accident, in the proper sense of a feature of a thing, for which Averroes
would take him severely to task, but the move was more subtle than that. 7) With
God, however, there can be no question of God's not existing, so God's essence
(dhat) must be identical with God's existing. 8 Maimonides will affirm this difference as uniquely expressive of divinity, adding a nuance reflecting the Islamic
discussion of attributes in God: "God exists without possessing the attribute of
existence, ... that is, God does not exist through existence, but [in God] existence
and essence are identical."9
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Aquinas, in what is arguably his first written work, the opusculum de Ente
et Essentia, sorts out the various senses these terms ejoyed in his predecessors,
Christian and Arab, and aligns Avicenna' s distinction with a step beyond Aristotle
yet more faithful to the movement of his thought than the platonic version
systematized by Ibn-Sina.!O For esse (to-be) becomes more than something adventitious to a thing's nature, but that which grants each natural being its ontological
unity. 11 What specific form accomplished for Aristotle, in making a thing this
sort of thing, esse will do for Aquinas, in making a thing this thing. Ontological
unity will then know two levels: matter to form, and informed matter (essence)
to esse, each related to its successor as potency to act.
God then becomes the One whose essence is to be-a formula which uniquely
identifies without pretending to be a proper definition-and so God may be said
to be "pure act."12 Such a One, Aquinas argues, must be eternally, since it
participates in no way in any movement from potentiality to act which would
bring it within the scope of time. Moreover, it must not only be said to be
eternal, but it "is its eternity, in a way which belongs to no other thing to be its
duration because nothing else is its esse."13 We may be said to endure, but it
takes a Faulkner so to concentrate our memories, for the now of present time is
evanescent. Furthermore, what "is its eternity," God alone can properly be said
to be eternal, or as Aquinas puts it: "eternity truly and properly belongs to God
alone" (LlO.3).
Other things, which for one reason or another, may be unaffected by time,
or to which time is irrelevant, may be said to be atemporal (or timeless), but
not, properly speaking, eternal. For what eternity adds to timelessness is the
"perfect possession all at once of limitless life."I3a Aquinas makes Boethius'
celebrated formula his own, and in doing so explicates it: the "perfect possession"
in question is the identity of the divine subject with its to-be, the absence of any
composition whatsoever, and hence a perfect at-one-ness with itself. And such
an unrestricted act of existing amounts to "limitless life."
These cumulating remarks may serve to indicate why I prefer not to speak of
eternity as a "mode of being," though we will inevitably be drawn to do so. For
the utter simpleness manifested by asserting the identity of essence with existence
in divinity offers a particularly perspicuous way of displaying that unity of God
which sets God off as the first and the source of all. God is not, then, a being
(among others) any more than the first (of many); so eternal does not mark a
division among beings like rational among animals, but rather names a unity
and a simpleness which quite transcends any mode of being with which we are
acquainted: personal, institutional, intentional, mathematicaL ... (That being said,
we will of course speak of eternity, prescending from divinity, as a mode of
being; and we may even find ourselves speaking of a divine mode of being, yet
we will do so now expressly realizing how easily such language allows us to
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pretend to be laying hold of what lies beyond our grasp.)
3. HOW TO CONCEIVE IT?

One relief these reminders offer is that we should not think ourselves dense
if we cannot conceive an "atemporal duration." One misleading by-product of
Kretzmann's and Stump's thumbnail sketch of "the development of the concept
of eternity" (444), in an article entitled "Eternity,"14 is that one might think
oneself to have missed a step if one could not now see how "eternity, not time,
is the mode of existence that admits of fully realized duration" (445). In a gently
persuasive voice, they suggest that "the apparent incoherence in the concept is
primarily a consequence of continuing to think of duration only as 'persistence
through time'" (446), whereas the sketch of "the tradition that nms through
Parmenides, Plato, and Plotinus into Augustine, Boethius, and Aquinas [would]
claim that it is only the discovery of eternity that enables us to make genuinely
literal use of words for duration, words such as 'permanence', and 'persistence',
which in their ordinary, temporal application tum out to have been unintended
metaphors" (445). So would they introduce "atemporal duration" as a technical
usage at "the heart of the concept of eternity" (444).
This narrative proves a likely story up to Aquinas, and even accounts for his
unwary expression: "eternity is the measure of permanent being (esse permanens)."15 But Aquinas would not have conceded that reflections on the evanescence of being in time would be able to establish a notion of eternity sufficiently
coherent for us. They can function at best as manuductiones-reminders which
can take us by the hand and lead us beyond what our concepts convey; for our
language is invariably tensed, and we can only come to an appreciation of eternity
through temporal considerations (1.10.1 .). Reflections on the sense of presence
evoked by the now of our continuing consciousness (which Augustine calls
memory) can usefully point us towards a fullness of present life, quite different
from atemporality, which the tradition intended when speaking of God's eternity.
But the fact is that same tradition counts fidelity the highest virtue because it
bespeaks constancy over time-through so many and such unsuspected vissicitudes! Even their helpful elaboration of the relation between temporal and
eternal entities or events (dubbed "ET simultaneity"), we shall see, derives its
consistency from the two metaphors of presence and containing which we
observed at work in Anselm.
A phrase like "atemporal duration," in short, does not make the notion of
eternity any more describable or expressible, for our language remains inevitably
tensed. So we will simply lack any means for directly describing eternity, and
if "eternity truly and properly belongs to God alone," that should not surprise
us, since we have no way of describing divinity either. Yet what Kretzmann's
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and Stump's treatment reminds us is that we should forbear calling incoherent
what we find ourselves unable to conceive. And since it is precisely the difficulties
attendant upon relating entities or events in time with those in eternity which
have drawn the charge of incoherence, those we must now consider. But first
two potential comparison terms, each called "eternal entities" in the tradition:
(1) angels, spheres, and the like; (2) necessary truths.
What about angels and spiritual creatures generally? This question is the easier
of the two, for one can note how, despite the fact that their life does not admit
stages of development, they nonetheless can mark a before and after in thought
and in affections. So if there be purely intentional (i.e., spiritual) creatures, they
would admit of no contingency as we experience it (in ipsa forma non est potentia
ad non esse), yet they stilI would not possess their life all-at-once, since they
would be conscious of their dependence upon the "creator, in whose power is
their very existence or non-existence" (1.9.2). That is, their awareness of
receiving their existence from another would admit another (God) into their sense
of themselves so that they could not be said to possess the total presence-to-self
which marks eternal being. Acknowledging that dependence, of course, becomes
their constitutive activity of praise, paradigmatic for all of creation. So the self
not simply itself becomes itself by recognizing its origins with suitable gratitude.
Such a composition, or lack of unity in their selfhood, would not place them in
time as such, for they are immaterial beings, nor would it qualify them for
eternity. Aquinas calls the mode aevum, or aeviternity.
So far as necessary truths are concerned, they seem best construed as atemporal. '6 What we mean by their being always true is that past, present, and future
are irrelevant to their truth-value; they do not intend reference to events. Whether
they can be cut loose from presence to a mind is a point which many would
strongly deny, so their being affirmed to be true would entail the now of some
consciousness. Aquinas, following Augustine, accommodated this formal fact
by locating them in their primordial instance in the divine intellect (1.10.3.3),
so granting them a share of God's eternity. One could hardly object to such a
placement so far as their dignity goes, though it has been queried whether that
solution is compatible with God's simpleness. 17 Yet God's knowing many things
seems no less an invasion of God's unity than God's creating a manifold universe.
And al-Farabi and Ibn-Sina's objections to the One creating many, epitomized
in the axiom "from one only one can come," have been recognized to stem from
an insufficiently intentional view of the divine nature. 18 If creation is regarded
not as a necessary emanation but as the intentional activity of a wise and powerful
God, however, then a multiplicity of ideas seems quite compatible with a single
intention. In both cases, then, God alone remains eternal.
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4. RELATING TEMPORALITIES WITH THE ETERNAL

Now to the question which often elicits cries of incoherence: the relation of
eternity to time, and vice versa. First of all, the abstract address is infelicitous.
As we are concerned, in addressing the "problem of evil," not with "evil" so
much as with evil actions, so here we are concerned with the possibility of
temporal and eternal beings relating to one another. So we will not be trying to
map out a set of formal relations between features of being which we can
formulate, since eternity is not, strictly speaking, a "mode of being," nor can
language (for most of us) escape temporal "consignification." Moreover, if my
elucidation of usage be persuasive, we are really concerned with a specific
dimension of God's relation to creation. In any case, all the pressing examples
presume the "eternal entity" to be God.
Because we are focussing on the (from our perspective) temporal dimension,
it may be helpful to employ some formal clarifications which prescind from
divinity, but the fact remains that the relationship in question is one of fecundity:
the proper effect of the creator (whose essence is to-be) is the to-be of things,
for creation is nothing other than "the production (or alternatively, emanation
[1.45.1]) of the whole of being (totius esse) by the universal cause of all things
(omnium entium), which is God" (1.45.3). What is more, the fundamental
guiding metaphor for the relationship is that of artisan, or creative artist, so the
best analogy we have for God's knowing creation will be artistic. These caveats
should help to keep us alert to infelicities like "God sees that it is the case," as
though there were things God had to notice.'8a On the other hand, of course, a
singular event or entity will not simply be comprehended by its creator "in
principle," but will be an object for God no less than the statue for the sculptor
or a character for an author.'9 It is simply that we cannot subtract the creative
activity from the knowing when we are dealing expressly with a creator God.
The central question has to do with the two now's: that of present time and
that of presence to, the Eternal. "Everything taking place in time is present to
God in eternity" (S.T. 1.14.13) cannot mean that what has not yet taken place
is now taking place in eternity. 20 The inherently indexical character of our now
cannot be obliterated by our presence to the Eternal. Kretzmann and Stump aptly
employ the results of special relativity theory here, to offer a leading example
of the "relativity of simultaneity" regarding events in frames of reference moving
with respect to one another. 21 In such cases, whenever the differential motion
approaches the speed of light, "one and the same time" will be amended, according
to the Lorentz transformations, to consider the relative motion of the two frames
of reference. Simultaneity, then, will be relative to the reference frame of a given
observer.
This example helps us in two ways with regard to events considered temporally
and eternally: (1) it warns us that questions like "are they really simultaneous?"
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cannot be answered when the reference frames are so diverse, and (2) that the
notion of simultaneity itself, at least in its normal meaning of "at one and the
same time," needs a good deal of elaboration. The example does not call that
meaning into question, so much as introduce complications, since the parameter
of the speed of light, together with the Lorentz transformations, allows one to
speak coherently, if sophisticatedly, of same or different times-now relative to
the observers.
4.1 A RECENT FORMULATION

When the reference frames are time and eternity, however, simultaneity can
no longer be parsed as "one and the same time." Kretzmann's and Stump's
strategy here is to expand the notion to a generic one of co-occurrence (or
occurrence at once) in which simultaneity as we know it becomes one species
(T-simultaneity=existence or occurrence at one and the same time), and simultaneity among eternal entities another: E-simultaneity=existence or occurrence
at one and the same eternal present (435). Then the search for the relation
between the now of present time and the present of eternity becomes the task
of formulating a third species: ET-simultaneity (436). Guiding this strategy is
the conviction that eternity and temporality are "two [separate 1 modes of real
existence" (434, 443), which we can parse as species within a genus.
Yet as we look more closely at the terms employed in their extremely helpful
formulation of "ET-simultaneity," we shall see that they embody the metaphors
of presence and containing already noticed. The formulations will be most useful
in keeping us from mixing the two senses of 'present', and so exposing more
than one claim of incoherence, yet of themselves give no further precision
regarding "the same eternal present." And that criticism concerns the strategy,
not the formulations, for I should not expect greater precision to be forthcoming.
The real question is whether "occurrence at once" (or co-occurrence) is really a
generic notion of which the others are species, or whether we have one notion
of simultaneity, admitting of an immense sophistication to embrace relativity,
which can be augmented with appropriate metaphors to formulate rules for our
reflections in domains quite beyond our ken? (And therein lies a central question
of method in philosophical theology.)
What Kretzmann and Stump propose to do, to respond to charges of incoherence, is to show how "what is temporal and what is eternal can co-exist, ... but
not within the same mode of existence" (436). Letting 'x' and 'y' range over
entities and events, they formulate "(ET)" thus:
For every x and for every y, x and y are ET simultaneous iff
(i) either x is eternal and y is temporal, or vice versa; and
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(ii) for some observer, A, in the unique eternal reference frame, x and
y are both present-i .e., either x is eternally present and y is observed
as temporally present, or vice versa; and
(iii) for some observer, B, in one of the infinitely many temporal reference frames, x and y are both present-i.e., either x is observed as
eternally present and y is temporally present, or vice versa (439).
Since the notion of "simultaneity" introduced here crosses reference frames, it
will not be transitive, showing that ET-simultaneity of two temporal events with
one eternal event entails nothing regarding the (temporal) simultaneity of these
events to one another. So given eternal event y, and temporal events x and z,
from (1) x is ET-simultaneous with y, and (2) y is ET-simultaneous with z,
nothing at all follows, since x and z are not "ET" -related. 22
Very helpful reminders when trying to make arguments involving the co-presence of eternal and temporal events. If my clarification of eternity be accurate,
however, there will be one and only one entity/event as well as observer in the
unique eternal reference frame. In that case the formulation reminds us that any
and every temporal entity/event will be present to that agent, Omega, whose
actions, while eternal, will be perceived (when so perceived!) by a temporal
observer as taking place in time. As I have suggested, this is a fair rendition of
the metaphors of presence and containing we noted in Anselm: all temporal
events and entities are present to God, who can thereby be said to contain them
all. Aquinas notes how the "existing all at once (tota simul existens) of eternity
embraces all of time" (S.T. 1.14.13), or more simply "includes all times" (S.T.
1.10.2.4).
Yet neither these metaphors nor "ET" help us to discern how it is that a
temporal event is present to the Eternal in such a way that every such event is,
and so eternity can be said to embrace time. Kretzmann and Stump say as much,
but then so has the tradition cited. 23 Aquinas even adds the baffling "in its
presentness" (1.14.13), to remind us that "divine knowledge is always ordered
to a thing as one present is ordered to something present" (de Ver. 2. 12)-something which would follow nicely from this formulation were one to stipulate that
all objects of divine knowledge be ET-simultaneous with the divine act of knowing. So one can say (now) that a future event (say, my death) is present to the
Eternal; not that God sees it before it happens, but that it-not yet, though certain
to me-is eternally present to God.
4.2. TOWARDS COHERENCE

That should suffice to elicit from us the retort that such language is totally
baffling; if one wishes to speak of "two separate modes of existence," it would
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help to acknowledge that one of them utterly escapes our capacity for formulation--except metaphorically, and that sentences which try to put the two together
can only baffle us. Here, of course, is where the suspicion of incoherence has
emerged. It is one thing to show us how to keep our language straight when
moving from one mode of affirmation (i.e., "eternally present") to another ("now
occurring"); it is something else to persuade us that it makes any sense (that
meaning of 'coherence': cohering with our experience) to make such assertions.
And the single sentence in which Kretzmann and Stump move (almost) beyond
the canonical metaphors, is, I believe, incoherent:
What the concept of eternity implies .. .is that there is one objective
reality that contains two modes of real existence in which two different
sorts of duration are measured by two irreducibly different sorts of
measure: time and eternity (443).
The notions which do not quite hang together here are the modifier 'objective',
the residual metaphor 'contains', and the relational predicate 'are measured by'.
When they explicate the phrase, everything turns on the relational predicate: an
event "is really future or not depending on which sort of entity, temporal or
eternal, it is being related to" (443). So far, so good. Yet can it also be said
that this act of relating (or measuring) so affects the "objective reality" in question
that it can be said to "contain two modes of real existence. '1" Or perhaps they
are speaking of "all reality." That is what remains baffling. And their explication
(though not their formulation) is reminiscent of Aquinas' celebrated image of
"natural things [suspended] between God's knowledge and ours, since we receive
our knowledge from the very things which God causes through [God's] knowledge" (S.T. 1.14.8.3). Such a picture sees the [objective] thing as constituted
by an intentional activity relating it to the Eternal, yet existing in time where it
presents itself as a temporal object of knowledge (and an object of temporal
knowledge, since our language is invariably tensed).
One might conclude from that, as Josef Pieper does, that each existing thing
may be the occasion for opening us onto the "mystery of being," but he is as
careful to call the relationship it bears to God's creative knowing a mystery, as
he is to remind us that the proper object of our knowing is each thing-as-related-tous. 24 That is a considerably more cautious, if far more lyrical, way of putting
the matter than contending that "one objective reality ... contains two modes of
real existence." Yet a bafflement remains: how then are such entities-suspended
between God's knowing and ours-one? Yet there is evidence that that question
is one of those which leads us yet more deeply into the mysteries of existence
than to further antinomies. 25
This final critique, and my nagging worry about their use of "modes of existence" should not blunt my appreciation nor indebtedness to their essay. They
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have exposed how the keenest of minds can lose their way in these thickets,
leading others astray as well, with jejeune claims of incoherence. Moreover,
they have indirectly opened a rich and rigorous philosophical tradition to many
contemporaries with neither the taste nor the aptitude for exploring the history
of these questions. And in doing so, they have shown how many traditional
positions can, on closer examination by keeping one's reference frames distinct,
not only be rescued from a bevy of recent prima facie changes of incoherence,
but in fact afford paradigms for philosophical argument and mines for continuing
inquiry. What they have not shown, however, is what might make such talk
coherent. Yet that very lacuna affords an opportunity for some far-reaching
reflections on method in philosophical theology.
5. IMAGE AND PERFORMANCE

One way to begin would suggest we need some new images for the relation
of time to eternity; often enough in these matters "image gives rise to thought. "26
One such is developed by Diogenes Allen, using the humble contrast of horizontal
and vertica1. 27 God's action, he tells us, is present to us as the line which marks
the intersection of vertical and horizontal planes . Yet if the vertical plane is not
visible, the line appears to be just that-a line in a horizontal plane. The assertion
that it is fonned by such an intersection, rather than merely given ("let there
be ... "), allows us to regard it as something richer than, say, an ordinary causal
sequence. Yet that affinnation remains one of faith. (This image does not pretend
to convey what presence and containing must, though one might project an
infinity of vertical planes onto the horizontal from an infinite eternal point--and
let oneself be carried away by the image!).
Allen's image, like Aquinas' of natural things somehow between two knowers
(and two very different kinds of knowledge), rather calls our attention to what
ordinarily escapes us, precisely because it (strictly speaking) lies beyond our
knowledge. 28 The task then becomes how one intelligently relates to what lies,
properly speaking, beyond one's knowledge-say, to eternity? The medieval's
pervasive belief in a spiritual world-not to be confused with their faith though
a useful vehicle for its expression29--offered them an analogy not readily available
to us: eternity contains time, as the soul the body, and more generally, as spirit
does matter. Our analogies are more likely to be images, it seems, more surely
drawn from the experience of life than from philosophical schemes, and-ironically enough, in what is touted as a "post-whatever" age-more directly from
religious practice. (Whatever may be our relation to our inherited religious
practice, a purportedly nihilistic age cannot denigrate religious practice in the
way common enough to philosophers in the centuries immediately preceding our
own.)
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It has been suggested that Aquinas' capacity to combine a live faith in the
reality of the Eternal with a rigorously empirical notion of the proper object of
human knowing--and hence a vast unknowing about matters eternal, can be
traced to a thoroughgoing sacramental vision born of daily practice. By 'sacramental' I mean that sense of the reality of ritual which brings God's saving
presence into the home-the family with the strangers in their midst-which
celebrates the Passover seder conscious of their connection with a people commanded to recall that liberation to each passing year. The event recalled was a
happening in history, but of such a sort that its ritual celebration renders its
effects present to each generation. There is, then, an eternal dimension to such
shaping acts of God which allows us, when duly celebrating them, not to re-enact
them but to render their inner reality as events present in our midst.
The reference to Jewish ritual is deliberate, for the structure of the beraka has
informed Christian prayer-notably eucharistic prayer-from the beginning; and
the polemics of the Reformation have until very recently rendered "sacramentality" a divisive word. Yet current attention to the broader outlines of liturgical
action, rather than the edges of theological arguments, has led those engaged in
revising books of worship to transcend effectively the polemics of four centuries
by attending to the balanced principle: no liturgy without hearing the word of
God; no proclamation of the Word without partaking of a meal. That is, a
community pretending to make the Word of God present without allowing itself
actively to be shaped by that same word can be said to be engaged in hocus-pocus;
whereas one which reads and explains that Word of God without tangibly displaying its nourishing quality in a ritual meal turns that action into exposition
(at best!) rather than allowing it to become the proclamation of a present reality.
Wherever the emphasis may lie, then, on word or on meal, the unity of
both--exemplified in the seder meal-offers, I am suggesting, a background
(and at particular times a foreground) in which the coherence of eternal action
in time, and of time present to eternity, might be experienced. There are questions
of right order attached to ritual actions, as conveyed by the term seder, and as
such these will be linked with various communities and their authoritative modes
of transmission; yet what is philosophically interesting about those modes (and
to my mind supplies the context for considering questions of authority) is that
they respect the way the actions are done, more than the commentary. It is as
though ritual action embodies a message more decisive than the explanations
elaborated about it-and this of course is precisely what anthropologists insist
upon. 30 Actions not simply performed before an audience, but actions participated
in by a congregation-that marks one note of difference in the theoretically
complex yet practically less vexing task of distinguishing ritual from non-ritual
activity.
Why should ritual action help us in composing temporal with eternal? Not so
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much because of the claims made for it-the theological explanations, if you
will-as the claims such activity makes upon us. We are asked to participate in
it, as a Muslim at prayer engages in profound bows. It is that action, if I am
not mistaken, which predisposes us to recognize eternal dimensions to temporal
events, much as the fact that something exists cannot be conceived as a property
of a thing but is better grasped on the analogy of an act-the act of affirming
or assenting to what might be said. Just as "existence," if you will, will not be
found in our expressions, but in our using them to assert something to be the
case, so we will never be able to express an "eternal mode of existence" in a
language which cannot avoid tenses, nor the indexical "now"-except by an
atemporal form contrived for timeless, not eternal things. So it may be that
intentional activities like asserting something to be the case, and ritual activities
like commemorating a saving event, may be sufficiently analogous to lead us to
some grasp of time's relation to eternity (speaking abstractly).
6. A RADICAL FORMULATION

The clue lies in Aquinas' pregnant statement that "eternity is the measure of
... esse while time is the measure of motion" 0.10.4). If we were to be acquainted
with something which simply was-that is, whose very nature was to be, such
an acquaintance would demand that we transcend everything temporal, if only
for a moment, to apprehend it properly. That, I take it, is the sense of 'measured
by' here: the connaturality required for understanding. The temptation here is
to picture being, in contrast to the world of becoming, as "the persistent, permanent, utterly immutable actuality that is required as the bedrock underlying the
evanescence of becoming. "31 This is a temptation because the image of permanent
bedrock clashes with actuality (which connotes activity), and so easily transmits
the equivocal expression 'immutable' as 'fixed' or 'static'. Yet these are temporal
terms, as are 'persistent' and 'permanent'. What is needed is a notion of actuality
which carries the sense of energeia without dunamis. That is what Aquinas
intends to convey by the language of actus essendi (act of existing), and by
assimilating existing to an act to which form would in tum be in potency. A
neat resolution of the difficulty Aristotle had in expressing how form brings
actuality (energeia) where the manifest activity seems to come from the potency
(dunamis) of matter. 32 What, in our actual world, form brings with it is the
actuality of existing. And the trick is to see that not as a mere given but by
analogy with those activities of existing things which show us they are alive;
particularly with that activity of affirming that something is the case, which
belongs to intentional beings.
This is an unwelcome move for philosophers, because, as Aristotle loved to
remind us, the essence is given in a formula, so that what lies beyond essence
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must, strictly speaking, be inexpressible. But if we can't whistle what we can't
say, we can, however, act it out. And that is what we do when we assert
something to be the case, or affinn something to be real. We don't go around
saying that, either, yet we do comport ourselves differently as a result. Not that
we don't have expressions like "it's true," "it's a fact," "there really are
aardvarks." It's just that we never quite know what we're saying when we utter
them, since we know what it is to describe something by qualifying it with the
appropriate predicates, yet we know in these cases that we're not doing that.
What we also know, however, is that our comportment towards them changes,
and that turns out to be a more important "fact" about them and about us than
all the descriptions we can muster.
My suggestion, then, is that direct expressions, like "atemporal duration,"
will be less helpful in our gleaning some sense for eternity, than attending to
those activities displayed in our using language to make the points we want to
make. For it is these activities, notably those of asserting and affinning, which
offer us a clue to the inexpressible fact/act of something's actually existing. (We
add 'actually' perhaps because the world in and among which we exist can
become commonplace, or because philosophers can get in the habit of attaching
'exists' to whatever we happen to be thinking about.) What distinguishes something's being the case from our entertaining that thought-this is what we are
after. The clue, again, lies in Aquinas' associating eternity with esse, and the
tradition's unanimity in reserving eternal for what "exists of itself," that One
whose essence is to be.
Aquinas himself can become lyrical when speaking directly of esse. 33 Yet
those moments only contribute to our suspense, since they hardly clarify. One
might suspect, however, that when a thinker as utterly measured as Aquinas
becomes lyrical, something is at stake. Perhaps yet another measure; a "mode
of being," if you will, quite beyond our grasp. And that he would affinn to be
the case--of the act of existing as well as of that eternity which characterizes
the One whose essence is simply to be, and hence can be called "pure act. "34
What is really at stake is a way of characterizing the act of creation. The question
on creation is a central locus, outside the early questions on divinity, where
Aquinas utilizes the identity of essence with esse in God. For it allows him, as
we have seen, to assert a link between creator and creature: the proper effect of
the first cause of all is the to-be of things (l.45. 5).
Besides neatly maintaining the transcendence of God, since this "proper effect"
is not a describable feature of things; by using the fonnula "ipsum esse per se
subsistens" for God (1.44.1) in the context of treating creation, Aquinas can set
the stage for conceiving creation as an intentional act. Since a thing's to-be
detennines the range of its powers, usually as detennined by a specific essential
structure, God's being subsistent to-be is a way of saying that divinity possesses
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whatever we recognize to be a perfection (of being), and does so "eminentiori
modo" (1.13.3) since they are not held by God as qualities admitting of more
or less, but as subsistent in divinity, qualifying each divine act.
The step from esse to intentionality in intentional beings is no step at all, since
esse viventibus est vivere so esse intelligentibus est intelligere [as "the to-be of
living things is to live," so "the to-be of intelligent beings is to understand"]. 35
So Aquinas is able to assert, knowing full well he cannot explain how, that God
directly creates all things. The net effect of this affirmation, in his context, was
to dispell the pseudo-explanation proferred by Ibn-Sina, after the initiative of
Al-Farabi. 36 Their emanation scheme for mediating the creative power of divinity
through ten spheres becomes otiose in a single stroke. Moreover, that same
stroke insists upon creation as a divine act rather than a necessary emanation,
and does so by a more rigorous application of the distinction between essence
and esse originally derived from the writings of Avicenna. While he had introduced the distinction to safeguard creation, his subsequent scheme for explaining
the emanation of many from One failed to maintain creation as a free divine act. .
What was a given of the Qur'an for Ibn-Sina became a hidden key to Aquinas'
entire cosmology. 37
7. STEPS REMAINING

And if creation represents the first chapter (alpha) in a narrative attempting
to relate time with eternity, the promise of eternal life represents the finale
(omega). For what this implies is a transformation of "those who believe in him"
so that they might participate in the divine mode of life: eternity. Needless to
say, such a promise has even less to do with "afterlife" than eternity with
timelessness. Moreover, the terms of the promise refer to a progressive incorporation into that life -.yhile living a temporal existence. So this avenue is also
available for gaining a gradual appreciation of eternity.
It is customary to close a philosophical discussion at this point, calling the
next step "mysticism." Yet if the subject in question demands such a preparation
of the whole person to understand it, why should the requisite disciplines be
considered any more irrelevant to grasping this subject than say, logic to general
philosophical inquiry? In any case, the preconditions for divine illumination so
carefully and warily set out by a John of the Cross, may be the most rigorous
available for the empirically minded among us attempting to make some sense
of eternity as "atemporal duration," or even better, as the "complete possession
all at once of limitless life. "38
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